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Pension funds have been expected to invest in a wide 
range of securities and provide liquidity to domestic 
capital markets since they are the most sophisticated 
investors, with plenty of resources to gather private 
information and manage portfolios professionally. 
However, by analyzing unique, monthly asset-level 
data from the pioneer case of Chile, this paper shows 
that pension funds tend to herd. This is consistent with 
pension funds copying each other in their investment 
strategies as a way to extract information, boost returns, 
and reduce risk. The authors compute measures of 
herding across asset classes (equities, government bonds, 
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may be contacted at sschmukle@worldbank.org.  
and private sector bonds) and at different pension fund 
industry levels. The results show that pension funds 
herd more in assets for which they have less market 
information and when risk increases. Moreover, herding 
is more prevalent across funds that narrowly compete 
with each other, that is, when comparing funds of the 
same type across pension fund administrators. There is 
much less herding within pension fund administrators 
and across pension fund administrators as a whole. This 
herding pattern is consistent with incentives for managers 
to be close to industry benchmarks, which might be 
driven by both market forces and regulation.   
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This paper uses a unique and rich micro dataset on pension funds to shed new light on 
how  incentives  might  affect  institutional  investors  in  their  portfolio  allocation  decisions.  In 
particular, we study two aspects discussed in the literature but still relatively unexplored: (i) how 
institutional  investors trade in  different  types  of assets  and (ii) what  incentives  managers at 
various  layers  of  the  financial  industry  face  when  implementing  their  investment  strategies. 
Because of the interest of the literature in herding behavior, we focus on herding statistics. This 
kind  of analysis helps  understand more broadly  the role of  institutional  investors on  capital 
market  activity  and  the  services  they  effectively  provide  as  financial  intermediaries. 
Furthermore, it offers new evidence on the importance of several factors often discussed in the 
literature on the behavior of institutional investors, including information, liquidity, incentives 
related to organizational aspects of the financial industry, and the regulatory framework in which 
managers operate. 
Institutional investors are interesting to analyze not only because they have become very 
large, but also because detailed asset-level portfolios over time (unavailable at the household or 
retail-investor  level)  are  sometimes  accessible.  In  particular,  institutional  investors  are 
increasingly relevant for both asset management and the development of financial systems. In 
fact, institutional investors are likely to be among the most important conduits of private and 
public savings, intermediating funds and supplying capital for firms and countries to grow. As 
institutional  investors  became  prevalent,  research  flourished  trying  to  understand  how  they 
invest. Many papers in the literature focus on equity mutual funds, for which portfolio data are 
mostly publicly available, and study their investment patterns (Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 
1999; and Kacperczyk et al., 2005). Others analyze general data on institutional investors (Sias 3 
 
and Starks, 1997; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Sias, 2004; and Choi 
and Sias, 2009).  
In this paper, we exploit new data and analyze the investment behavior of pension funds, 
for which relatively little is known although they have played a crucial role across countries. The 
few studies available on pension fund investment behavior are very informative, but they only 
use part of the data available on pension funds in a given country. They typically use quarterly 
data for a subsample of pension funds and focus exclusively on equity holdings. Lakonishok et 
al. (1992), Badrinath and Wahal (2002), and Ferson and Khang (2002) analyze US data, while 
Blake et al. (2002) and Voronkova and Bohl (2005) analyze data from  the UK and Poland, 
respectively.  The  limited  scope  of  the  data  and  the  emphasis  on  equity  holdings  present 
important shortcomings because most pension funds worldwide invest a large fraction of their 
portfolios in bonds and other types of assets, and their trading patterns might differ significantly 
across asset classes. 
We use data from Chile, which was the first country to embrace the new mandatory, 
privately  managed,  defined-contribution  (DC)  pension  fund  model,  by  replacing  the  public, 
defined-benefit  (DB)  pension  system  with  a  DC  one  in  May  1981.  Many  developed  and 
developing countries have followed suit and reformed their pension regimes, establishing very 
similar pension funds.
1 For example, the UK moved toward a multi -pillar pension system in 
1986. Sweden modified in 1994 the pension system from a pay-as-you-go DB to a second-pillar 
system that includes a voluntary DC system. In the US, proposals to reform the social security 
system were also recurrently considered. Following Chile’s example, many developing countries 
adopted similar reforms, including Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
                                                 
1 These changes reached even the corporate sector, entailing a shift away from defined-benefit schemes toward 
defined-contribution schemes to transfer risk from corporations to employees. 4 
 
Republic, El Salvador, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Peru, Slovakia, Poland, and 
Uruguay.  
The data we assemble contain the detailed portfolios of the universe of Chilean pension 
funds in all types of securities and asset classes at a monthly frequency for ten years, 1996 to 
2005. We also compile the monthly returns of each instrument included in these portfolios. The 
dataset contains 3,869,290 observations, with information on the holdings and returns of 24,322 
different securities for up to 57 pension funds. We then compute different estimates of herding, 
which are associated with funds buying/selling the same assets simultaneously. 
This new dataset  allows  us  to  shed light  on a series  of questions  regarding different 
aspects of pension fund investment strategies and overall behavior. In particular, do pension 
funds  herd,  buying/selling  the  same  assets  simultaneously?  Is  their  herding  pattern  different 
across asset classes with varying liquidity and information? Does their herding behavior vary at 
different levels of the pension fund organization structure? What does their behavior tell about 
the  incentives  that  managers  face  to  compete  with  each  other?  Does  herding  change  with 
purchases in primary and secondary markets? Does it differ on the buying and selling sides? Is 
trading  activity  associated  with  variations  in  returns?  Understanding  herding  is  important 
because this behavior can contribute to market volatility. Moreover, it means that managers are 
not generating independent assessments in the markets and  might not be providing different 
services to pensioners.  
In addressing these questions, we investigate at least three important aspects of herding 
discussed in the literature. First, traders might copy other traders in the process of extracting 
private information (Shiller and Pound, 1989; Sharfstein and Stein, 1990; Banerjee, 1992; and 
Bikhchandani  et  al.,  1992).  Since  some  assets  are  more  obscure  than  others,  the  degree  of 5 
 
herding is expected to decrease with the transparency of the assets for a given level of risk.
2 In 
other words, securities for which information is widely available and that entail less risk are less 
likely to induce herding patterns. We thus exploit our dataset to analyze herding by asset type by 
the same institutional investors. In particular, we calculate herding in corporate bonds, financial 
institutions bonds, government bonds, mortgage bonds, and equity.  
Second, herding might also be explained by managers following similar trading strategies 
like momentum (Froot et al., 1992 and Gompers and Metrick, 2001).   Momentum  trading, 
defined as the purchasing (selling) of assets whose returns are positive (negative),  is a popular 
investment  strategy  and  has  been  often  found  in  developed  and  developing  countries.   Its 
presence among US institutional investors (primarily mutual funds) has been widely documented 
in the literature.
3 Our data on returns allows us to test whether, to the extent that there is herding, 
it is driven by momentum strategies. 
Third, managers might herd as a  way to reduce risk.  While traditional theories of asset 
allocation focus on the problem of an isolated investor whose goal is to maximize wealth or 
consumption at some point in time, several papers study the incentives schemes that arise in the 
context of financial intermediation. In particular, the conflicts of interest between fund managers 
and the underlying investors can affect manager risk-taking behavior (Sharfstein and Stein, 1990; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999;  Graham, 1999;  Stein, 2003, 2005; 
                                                 
2 Although theoretical models of herding behavior do not focus on the characteristic of the assets as a determinant of 
herding, they typically imply a relation with opacity. For instance, in Sharfstein and Stein (1990), herding can only 
occur when there are “systematically unpredictable factors affecting the future state that nobody can know anything 
about,”  that  is,  under  the  presence  of  an  unobservable  common  component  to  prediction  errors.  This  type  of 
situation is more likely in less transparent assets. In transparent assets, most of the prediction errors should be 
idiosyncratic. Similarly, in the model of Banerjee (1992), the probability that no agent chooses the right investment 
option because of herding is declining in the probability that an agent receives a signal about the state of nature, and 
in the probability that the signal is true. In the context of asset selection, these probabilities are likely to be lower for 
more opaque assets.    
3 See, for example, Grinblatt et al. (1995), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Kaminsky et 
al. (2004), Sias (2004, 2007), and Greenwood and Nagel (2009). 6 
 
Kapur and Timmermann, 2005; and Bolton et al., 2006). The underlying investors, the regulator, 
and the asset management companies monitor managers on a short-run basis to reduce principal-
agent problems, generating incentives for managers to be averse to investments that (though 
potentially profitable) are different from those held by their competitors. Namely, deviating from 
the  pack  might  entail  reputational  costs  or  regulatory  penalties  since  the  principal  cannot 
evaluate  whether  the  agent  deviated  for  good  reasons.  Herding  behavior  is  thus  a  natural 
response of managers to avoid penalties. The data we assemble allow us to study herding at 
different levels of the pension fund industry. In particular, we study herding among pension fund 
administrators (PFAs), individual pension funds across the entire industry, individual pension 
funds  within  PFAs,  and  similar  types  of  pension  funds  across  PFAs.  We  expect  herding  to 
increase for fund managers of similar types of pension funds, as comparisons are easier to make 
and competition intensifies.   
The main results from this paper can be summarized as follows. First, pension funds tend 
to herd on their investment decisions, that is, they buy/sell the same assets at the same time. 
Second,  herding  varies  substantially  across  asset  classes.  In  particular,  herding  is  more 
pronounced in corporate bonds and financial institutions bonds (which are similar to corporate 
bonds), while there is less herding in equity and mortgage bonds. Relative to corporate bonds, 
equity is better known by investors since few, large companies are the ones that tend to dominate 
trading activity. Moreover, equity tends to be traded frequently in secondary markets, sending 
continuous price signals to investors. Instead, similarly to the US, Chilean corporate bonds trade 
infrequently and part of their trading occurs over the counter.
4 Mortgage bonds are safer than 
corporate bonds since they are backed by real estate.  Furthermore, the asset class in which the 
                                                 
4  For  the  relationship  between  size,  trading  activity,  and  opacity,  see  Bessembinder  and  Maxwell  (2008)  and 
Livingston et al. (2007). 7 
 
least herding occurs is government bonds, which are issued by a well-known government that 
has followed transparent and sound macroeconomic policies and are in turn the assets perceived 
to bear the lowest risk. In other words, pension funds tend to herd more in the asset classes that 
are more opaque. The results hold across different levels of the pension fund industry. This result 
is consistent with pension funds trying to copy each other in their portfolio decisions, especially 
for the assets for which they can derive less information from the markets. Third, herding is the 
most intense when comparing funds of the same type across PFAs. That is, herding peaks as 
funds narrowly compete with each other across PFAs to retain pensioners and/or avoid market or 
regulatory  punishment.  PFAs  as  a  whole  also  herd  but  less  intensively,  since  the  overall 
administrators are not so narrowly compared with each other by either markets or regulators. The 
least  intense  herding  occurs  among  funds  within  PFAs,  where  competition  is  little  as  the 
incentives for PFAs is to keep pensioners within the PFA, in any fund. Fourth, we do not find 
evidence that momentum trading is the main cause of the herding observed in domestic assets. 
Fifth, although the patterns found in this paper might be influenced by certain aspects of the 
regulation that make funds across PFAs compare with each other, the investment decisions of 
fund managers cannot be neglected since, among other things, there is no specific mandate for 
pension funds to trade in specific securities and herding does not decrease when regulations are 
relaxed.  Moreover,  the  behavior  does  not  seem  to  be  explained  by  the  lack  of  investable 
instruments because pension funds do not even invest in all of the available and pre-approved 
assets. 
The  findings  on  herding  have  implications  for  the  general  debate  on  capital  market 
development. One key motivation for countries to promote institutional investors in general, and 
pension funds in particular, has been the expectation that they would play a dynamic role in the 8 
 
development of capital markets. This motivation has been particularly important in developing 
countries.
5 In many respects, pension funds might be better equipped than other institutional 
investors to have a positive impact on capital markets. Since pensioners save for the long run and 
provide a steady flow of funds, pension funds (unlike other institutional or retail investors) are 
expected to be able to provide  stable long-term financing to domestic corporations as well as 
governments. Moreover, considering their size and commission fees, pension  funds should be 
able to professionally manage the asset allocation, diversify risk appropriately, and overcome 
problems of asymmetric information and transaction costs that pervade financial markets. Also, 
given that pension funds usually face regulatory requirements to allocate a large fraction of the 
assets under management domestically and given that they tend to accumulate large capital, they 
could invest in a relatively broad range of (pre-approved) domestic assets and diversify risk as 
much as possible within the country. Therefore, relative to other institutional investors, pension 
funds are thought to be the ones that contribute the most to the development of domestic capital 
markets by, among other things,  investing in different types of securities,  providing liquidity, 
knowing the markets, and pursuing investment strategies with long-term goals. 
Despite the initial expectations, the actual impact that the increasing prominence of 
pension funds has had on the development of local capital markets in developing countries is still 
subject to debate. Some authors argue that pension funds foster the deepening of domestic equity 
and debt markets through their demand for investment instruments and their effect on corporate 
governance, and  add to the liquidity of these markets through their trading activity .
6  Others 
                                                 
5 Davis (1995) argues that pension funds improve the depth of capital markets since they invest in long-term and 
riskier assets. Impavido and Musalem (2000) argue that pension funds also increase capital market innovation, 
competition, and efficiency. Impavido et al. (2003) find that the institutionalization of savings increases market 
depth and in some cases improves stock market liquidity. Also see Piñera (1991), Vittas (1995 and 1999), Reisen 
(2000), Blommestein (2001), Davis and Steil (2001), and de la Torre and Schmukler (2006), among others.  
6 See Davis (1995), Vittas (1995 and 1999), Catalán et al. (2000), Lefort and Walker (2000, 2002a , and 2002b), 
Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), Catalán (2004), and Andrade et al. (2007). 9 
 
maintain that pension funds do not contribute as expected to the development of capital markets, 
and are not investing pensioners’ savings optimally.
7 The types of patterns documented in this 
paper contribute to this debate. They  do not seem fully consistent with the initial expectations 
that pension funds would be a dynamic force stimulating the overall development of  secondary 
capital markets. Pension funds may ease the access of some firms to fun ds through equity or 
bond primary issuances and thus have a positive effect on the development of primary capital 
markets. But their degree of herding, both in the buying and selling side, suggest that pension 
funds might contribute less than expected to the liquidity of different markets, price formation, or 
the provision of distinct alternative investment vehicles for pensioners.
8  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 very briefly summarizes the main 
features of the case of Chile and its pension fund system. Section 3 describes the data and some 
basic turnover statistics. Section 4 studies different turnover measures. Section 5 explores what 
other factors might be related to herding behavior. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Chile’s Pension Fund System 
Chile is a good natural case study to analyze in depth the behavior of pension funds and, 
more broadly, institutional investors. Chile not only introduced the new pension fund system, but 
also continuously improved the regulatory environment such that pension funds become better 
investment vehicles for pensioners. At the same time, it also fostered the development of mutual 
funds and insurance companies as alternative and complementary investment vehicles.  Aside 
from  reforming  the  institutional  investor  base,  Chile  has  more  broadly  implemented  and 
                                                 
7 See Arrau and Chumacero (1998), Zurita (1999), IMF and World Bank (2004), Olivares (2005), Yermo (2005), 
Berstein and Chumacero (2006), and The Economist (2008). 
8 Moreover, pension funds invest heavily short term. Opazo et al. (2009) show that Chilean pension fund portfolios 
are short term relative to those of insurance companies and US mutual funds.  10 
 
succeeded in a series of macroeconomic and institutional policies to achieve a stable market-
friendly economy, where capital markets play an important role and investors have incentives to 
participate. Furthermore, as mentioned in the Introduction, among many countries, Chile has 
been regarded as the example to follow in terms of pension fund and capital market reforms. 
In 1980, Chile decided to reform its pension fund system and replaced over time the pay-
as-you-go  system  with  a  fully-funded  capitalization  system  based  on  individual  accounts 
operated  by  the  private  sector  and  regulated  by  the  Superintendency  of  Pensions 
(Superintendencia de Pensiones, SP). At the time of the transition, contributors were given the 
choice of remaining in  a national state-run DB system or transferring to the new individual 
account system. All new entrants to the wage workforce would be automatically enrolled in the 
new scheme and would select a pension fund administrator (PFA) to manage their accounts, but 
could not select individual investments themselves.  
Over time, the system became more flexible as investment regulations were relaxed and 
choices increased. During the first ten years of the system, each PFA managed a unique fund 
offering no choice to individuals in terms of risk-return combinations. The set of choices was 
expanded in March 2000 by the introduction of a new fund type (Fund 2), and in August 2002 by 
the implementation of the multi-fund scheme in which all PFAs started offering a set of five 
different  funds  to  their  contributors  (Funds  A  to  E).  Each  fund  type  is  subject  to  different 
restrictions  on  its  asset  allocation.  Therefore,  the  entire  set  of  funds  offers  more  flexibility 
through different risk-return combinations, with Fund A (Fund E) being the most (least) risky. 
Depending on their age and gender profile, contributors can choose among a subset of these five 
funds.  11 
 
The mandate of each pension fund is to provide the highest possible returns to pensioners 
given the set of risk parameters and investment regulations. There are no restrictions on the 
amount and type of trading activity and they do not operate like individual life-cycle funds. Their 
mandate differs from that of life insurance companies that need to meet the (typically long-term) 
obligations stipulated in the insurance contracts. Pension fund managers, on the other hand, do 
not have liabilities with the pensioners; they simply manage their assets. 
Chilean  pension  fund  administrators  invest  in  different  assets  subject  to  a  set  of 
quantitative  restrictions  that  are  defined  by  law  and  that  specify  how  much  pension  fund 
administrators are allowed to invest in specific instruments. Pension funds can only invest in 
assets listed in the pension law and traded in public offerings. These investment limits have been 
relaxed over time, incorporating quantitative and conceptual changes. However, these limits do 
not seem to have been binding (except for the case of foreign investments which reached the 
limit over time). During the period 2002-2005, PFAs invested in only a subset of the assets 
approved for investment by the Risk-Rating Commission (Comisión Clasificadora de Riesgo, 
CCR). For example, during this period they invested in 65-72 percent of all the approved equity 
and in 15-18 percent of all the approved foreign mutual funds. Within a PFA, pension fund 
portfolios  are  managed  separately,  but  the  PFA  provides  market  analysis  and  asset 
recommendations to all its funds, resulting in some correlation on portfolio compositions.
9 
Aside from the investment restrictions, pension funds are subject to a minimum return 
regulation that establishes that administrators are responsible for ensuring an average real rate of 
return over the last 36 months that exceeds either ( i) the average real return of all funds  of the 
same type (i.e., Funds C are benchmarked with other Funds C) minus two percentage points for 
                                                 
9 Most PFAs have managers that specialize in broad asset classes (fixed income and variable income) and participate 
in the construction of the portfolios of each of the funds. 12 
 
Funds C, D, and E, and minus four percentage points for Funds A and B, or (ii) 50 percent of the 
average real return of all the funds of the same type, whichever is lower. The average real rate of 
return to calculate the minimum return changed from 12 months to 36 months in October 1999, 
giving PFAs more flexibility to deviate in the short term from the industry comparators.
10 This 
type of regulation can be found in other co untries and, as shown below, it cannot be the only 
factor determining the behavior of pension funds since there is not a clear change in behavior 
after the regulation is relaxed.
11 
 
After the introduction of the multi-fund scheme in August 2002, investment limits per 
instrument set by the central bank did not change for domestic instruments in the 2002-2005 
period, but were relaxed twice for foreign investments (an additional relaxation took place in 
August  2002).  Limits  on  domestic  fixed-income  (variable-income)  instruments  gradually 
increase (decrease) as funds become less risky (i.e., when one moves from Fund A toward Fund 
E).
12  
Over time, pension fund administrators have grown substantially and have become the 
largest  institutional  investors  in  Chile.  Assets  under  pension  fund  management  increased 
substantially both in absolute and relative terms . In 2005, pension funds manag ed around 75 
billion dollars, an amount that was almost 2.5 times the 1996 value in real terms. A s a share of 
                                                 
10 PFAs must keep a return fluctuation reserve equal to one percent of the value of each fund, which is used if the 
minimum  return  is  not  achieved.  When  the  difference  is  not  completely  covered  by  this  reserve  or  the 
administrator’s funds, the state must provide for it. However, in this case or when the reserve is not restored after 
being used (in a 15-day period), the PFA’s operating license can be revoked. 
11 The use of a minimum return band  is not specific to Chile; most Latin Ameri can countries with a defined -
contribution pension  fund system offer guaranteed minimum returns, either relative or absolute. For instance, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay guarantee these minimum returns, and funds are 
required to maintain reserves to meet these guarantees in case of underperformance. Among major reformers, only 
Mexico does not guarantee a minimum return. 
12  Fund A is the riskiest fund, having the lowest (highest) limits on domestic fixed -income (variable-income) 
instruments across the five funds. Fund E is the most conservative fund, having the highest limits on fixed -income 
instruments, the only instruments in which its assets are allowed to be invested. For foreign investments, the limit is 
set at the PFA level and was relaxed twice during 2003. The maximum allowed by law is 30 percent of the value of 
all funds managed by a single PFA. 13 
 
GDP, assets managed by pension funds increased by 1.85 times, from 38 percent in 1996 to 71 
percent in 2005. Since their inception in 1981 and 2005, pension funds grew at an average annual 
rate of 28 percent in GDP terms. Furthermore, pension funds held around ten percent of equity 
market  capitalization  (which  corresponds  to  around  28  percent  of  free-float),  60  percent  of 
outstanding domestic public sector bonds, and 30 percent of corporate bonds’ capitalization in 
2004. Figure 1 shows the evolution of pension system holdings as a share of GDP. 
As assets under management expanded, the industry consolidated. The number of PFAs 
operating in Chile decreased by two-thirds while the number of pension funds doubled. The 
number of PFAs decreased from 15 to six due to a series of mergers and acquisitions that took 
place  mostly  in  the  late  1990s.  Since  the  number  of  pension  funds  in  the  market  has  been 
proportional to the number of PFAs, the number of pension funds increased from 15 (one per 
PFA) to 30 (five per PFA) from July 1996 to December 2005. 
 
3. Data and Turnover Statistics 
The  data  used  in  this  paper  come  from  Chile’s  Superintendency  of  Pensions 
(Superintendencia de Pensiones, SP) and consist of a panel of all the portfolio investments of 
PFAs in operation, for each of their funds, during the period July 1996 to December 2005 at a 
monthly frequency, including information on returns. In other words, the dataset has information 
on the price and quantity for every security held by fund per unit of time. We define a fund as a 
pair PFA/fund type (e.g., Fund C of PFA Aporta configures a single fund). After cleaning the 
dataset, we use 3,869,290 observations, representing all domestic fixed income securities and 
domestic equity held during each month by at least one fund.  14 
 
The dataset contains information on the holdings of 24,322 different securities, for up to 
57 funds, at a monthly frequency. These securities are divided into 20 different instrument types. 
We group all the instrument types into five general asset classes: corporate bonds, financial 
institutions bonds, government bonds, mortgage bonds, and equity.
13,14 The average portfolio 
holding in each class by type of fund is displayed in Table 1.  
The securities analyzed in this paper vary across different dimensions associated with the 
availability  of  market  information  on  issuing  companies  and  the  availability  of  quoted  and 
realized  market  prices  for  institutional  investors.  Table  2  shows  some  characteristics  of 
issuances, trading activity, and size of issuers for the key assets classes analyzed in this paper: 
corporate bonds (including those issued by financial companies, which tend to be similar to 
corporate bonds), government bonds, and equity.
15 During the sample period, issuance per year 
is highest for corporate bonds, then government bonds, and lastly equity  (Panel A). This is 
expected since many companies issue bonds, and they have to continue issuing them over time as 
bonds mature and firms seek refinancing. But the amount issued in corporate bonds per company 
is much smaller than the total amount issued by the government, and similar to the equity issued 
per company.
16 Panel B shows data on turnover ratios (annual value traded divided by en d-of-
                                                 
13 The original data also contain information on the holdings of derivatives, investment and mutual fund quotas, 
former pension system bonds, deposits, and foreign assets, but  we exclude them from the analysis for various 
reasons. For instance, former pension system bonds are securities that were issued to the workers that moved from 
the old pay-as-you-go system to the new pension system when the reform was implemented in 1981. Thus, they are 
highly idiosyncratic and are increasingly disappearing as the system matures. Also, while quotas of investment and 
mutual funds are variable income instruments, the underlying assets are in many cases fixed-income (bond funds) or 
a combination of bonds and equity, so they cannot be easily mapped into the standard categories. Foreign assets are 
excluded because, for regulatory reasons, most foreign investment carried out by Chilean pension funds occurs 
through the purchase of quotas of foreign investment funds. 
14 While mortgage bonds (letras hipotecarias) represent 73.3 percent of the observations, they only stand for 19.6 
percent of the investment when considering the entire period 1996-2005. 
15 In this table, corporate bonds and financial institutions bonds are grouped together for data availability reasons. 
16 The median amounts per issue are smaller for corporate bonds than for equity, since companies typically issue 
several series of a corporate b ond. Median amounts per issue for government bonds are small because the 
government tries to issue regularly to provide liquidity to the market and establish the benchmark yield curve. 15 
 
the-year market capitalization) across these three asset classes. Clearly, government bonds are 
the asset class with the highest turnover, followed by equity, and corporate bonds. Government 
bonds  and  equities  not  only  have  higher  turnover  than  corporate  bonds,  but  also  are  more 
frequently  traded  in  open  exchanges  (Panel  C).  For  instance,  equities  from  the  40  listed 
companies that compose the main Chilean stock market index (IPSA) (where pension funds 
invest most of their equity portfolio) traded on average 92 percent of the trading days in 2004. 
Government bonds of maturities between 8 to 10 years also traded almost every day. In contrast, 
corporate bonds of intermediate maturities (8-10 years) traded 46 percent of the time during that 
year.
17 Finally, companies listed in the stock exchange are typically larger than those that issue 
corporate bonds. Panel D compares the median size of the main listed companies and of those 
companies that have issued corporate bonds. It shows that, despite corporate bond  issuers being 
relatively large in Chile, they are typically smaller than the main  companies listed in the stock 
exchange (median assets of US$ 750 million versus US$ 1,900 million for listed firms in 2005). 
Even the 40 largest companies with corporate  bonds outstanding during 2002-2005 are smaller 
than the 40 main listed companies included in the IPS A (median assets US$ 1,700 versus US$ 
1,900 million in 2005).  
In summary, the data show that government bonds are widely available, frequently 
traded, and  have easily available price information. Equity markets are dominated by large 
corporations, whose stocks trade frequently in open exchanges. Corporations issuing corporate 
bonds are smaller than those issuing equity, issuances are large, but they are infr equently traded 
and a non-trivial part of this activity occurs over the counter. These differences suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, this should not make each issuance less transparent since the underlying debtor is the same. Summary 
statistics on amounts per issue are not reported, but are available upon request.  
17 Data on the trading frequency of corporate and government bonds come from Lazen (2005). Trading frequency 
for equities come from the Santiago Stock Exchange. 16 
 
corporate bonds are probably the most opaque of the Chilean asset classes, followed by equity 
and finally government bonds. 
To complement the analysis, we display here some basic measures of turnover or trading 
activity by pension funds of different types of securities. Turnover is generally related to market 
liquidity, which is vital for the emergence of new instruments, capital raising activity, and the 
functioning  of  secondary  markets.  More  trading  reduces  the  cost  of  immediate  execution, 
lowering bid-ask spreads and reducing firm’s opportunity cost of capital.
18  
Table 3 Panel A shows that pension funds tend to trade infrequently. In particular, Panel 
A shows what fraction of its assets a given PFA trades at any moment in time. The table presents 
two simple statistics: the number of total assets traded by a PFA in a given period relative to the 
total number of holdings in the PFA’s overall portfolio (column 1) and the value of the aggregate 
portfolio that experiences some activity in a given month (column 2), both averaged over time.
19 
On average, a PFA trades only 13 percent of its assets and the monthly changes in positions in 
those assets correspond to just four percent of the initial total value of the PFA’s assets. This low 
number contrasts with the 88 percent of the mean turnover ratio found in Kacperczyk et al. 
(2008) for a sample of 2,543 actively managed US equity mutual funds between 1984 and 2003, 
suggesting that Chilean PFAs are rather passive in their trading behavior. There is important 
variation across asset classes in the degree of PFA trading activity. The most traded assets are 
equities and mortgage bonds. On the other hand, there is a low degree of trading in corporate and 
financial institution bonds.
20  
                                                 
18 See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Chordia et al. (2001), and Bekaert et al. (2007).  
19 Infrequent trading does not necessarily mean that PFAs do not actively change the relative composition of their 
portfolios because, even if most assets are not traded, their relative importance depends on the changes experienced 
by those that are active. 
20  The turnover measures described above are useful to determine the extent to which PFAs rebalance their 
portfolios, but they do  not appropriately capture the extent to which that rebalancing is passive or active. In other 
words, part of the turnover might just be the consequence of passive trading due to: (i) the constant net inflows PFAs 17 
 
An  alternative  way  to  gauge  the  extent  to  which  managers  are  actively  trading  their 
portfolios is to focus on fixed-income instruments (which are also of fixed term). The useful 
feature of these assets is that they do not need to be traded to recover the initial investment, as 
managers can wait until maturity and collect coupons in the meantime. Table 3 Panel B presents 
two statistics per asset class: (i) the average proportion of units of a given security that a PFA 
incorporates to its portfolio in its first purchase and (ii) the proportion of units of that security 
that a PFA liquidates at the security’s maturity date. Both measures are relative to the maximum 
number of units of that security that the PFA holds in its portfolio at any time. They show that, 
on average, PFAs purchase most of their fixed-income assets at once and liquidate most of them 
upon maturity, not before. That is, although pension funds might hold a large fraction of the 
outstanding securities, they trade a small fraction of them in secondary markets. This buy-and-
hold behavior is common in this type of institutional investors, although it runs contrary to the 
idea  that  pension  funds  would  provide  liquidity  to  secondary  markets.  Nonetheless,  even  in 
fixed-income assets, pension funds still trade between 5 to 10 percent of their holdings over the 
lifetime of the asset. 
 
4. Do Pension Funds Herd? 
To formally test for the presence of herding we compute different estimates of herding. 
These measures focus on whether funds simultaneously buy or sell the same assets in a given 
moment. We measure the degree of herding using the approach of Lakonishok et al. (1992), 
which relies on the idea that when there is no herding the probability of buying has to be equal 
                                                                                                                                                             
receive from current contributors that have not yet retired, or (ii) outflow due to pensioners retiring and leaving the 
system. Passive trading might also occur because some assets mature and, in order to reinvest them, PFAs need to 
purchase new instruments. Therefore, the amount of active turnover and the number of managers willing to change 
positions over time to maximize returns is lower than the turnover measures reported above. 18 
 
among assets being traded. Therefore, a measure of the difference between the probabilities of 
buying across assets can be used to test the hypothesis of no herding.  
In particular, Lakonishok et al. (1992) define the herding statistic        as:   
          
      
                        ,  (3) 
where      is the probability of buying any asset at time  ,        is the number of funds that 
increase their holdings of asset   at time   (buyers),        is the number of sellers of asset   at 
time  , and                          the number of funds active on asset   at time   (i.e., either 
buying or selling), and         is an adjustment factor. To build the herding statistic we identify 
a purchase (sale) as an increase (decrease) in the number of units of a given asset held by a PFA. 
Under the hypothesis that no herding occurs, the number of buyers         follows a 
binomial distribution with parameters      and       , and the adjustment factor         is the 
expected value of the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) under this hypothesis, 
which is positive because of the use of the absolute value. Therefore, if no herding occurs we 
should be unable to reject the null hypothesis that the herding statistic has a zero mean.
21 
The adjustment factor         is                                  , where        is the 
probability of buying an asset   at time  . The proportion of all funds that buy during period   is 
used as a proxy for          , and due to the assumption that the number of buyers in each 
period  follows  a  binomial  distribution,           can  be  calculated  as: 
              
      
                              
 
               
      
    ,  which  can  be  further 
simplified in order to carry out the calculations.
 
                                                 
21 We compute tests for the average       . When divided by its standard deviation, this random variable follows a t 
distribution under the law of large numbers.   19 
 
In  what  follows,  we  focus  on  measures  per  asset  class,  where  we  compute  different 
probabilities of buying an asset (    ) for each asset class because of the large differences in 
trading activity across asset classes reported in Tables 2 and 3.  
As explained above, our data have information on the detailed portfolios of all pension 
funds managed by the universe of pension fund administrators (PFAs). Furthermore, we know 
which PFA manages each of the funds.  We use this information to test for the presence of 
herding at four levels of aggregation. First, we test for herding at the PFA level (aggregating all 
funds managed by a PFA in a single portfolio). This neglects within-PFA herding and only 
considers herding among administrators. Second, we also test for herding at the PFA-fund level, 
which considers both herding within and across administrators. Two or more funds within a PFA 
or across PFAs buying the same asset would equally contribute to this herding statistic. Third, 
we consider herding at the within-PFA level, which only looks at whether funds managed by the 
same PFA tend to buy/sell the same assets. Finally, we test for the presence of herding across 
PFAs, but within a given fund type. Only funds of the same type (from A to E) trading the same 
assets count for the computation of the statistic. Testing for herding at these different levels of 
aggregation provides valuable information on the determinants of herding and the incentives that 
managers have to engage in this behavior. The results of these exercises follow.
 
Table 4 reports herding results at the PFA level, with each entry displaying the mean of 
the herding statistic for each asset class and its corresponding standard error, using an asset-
class-specific probability of buying an asset. Column (1) presents the results obtained computing 
the statistic across all assets traded by more than one PFA. To show the robustness of the results 
to different estimates of herding, columns (2) and (3) report the herding statistics computed over 
those assets traded by more than two and three PFAs. Column (4) reports the average asset-20 
 
specific probabilities of buying an asset for each asset class (    ). For example, the average 
probability of buying instruments from domestic financial institutions, conditional on trading 
them, is 51 percent and the average probability of buying mortgage bonds is 13 percent. 
The results in Table 4 show that there is robust evidence of herding, both overall and 
across asset classes. Except for government bonds traded by more than one PFA, one observes 
positive and statistically significant  coefficients  regardless  of the number of PFAs trading  a 
given asset. The results also show significant differences in the coefficients of herding across 
asset classes within each column. Herding seems to be stronger for corporate bonds and financial 
institutions bonds. This ranking of herding across asset classes closely resembles the differences 
in market transparency of different asset classes documented in Section 3. As shown in Table 2, 
while Chilean corporate bonds are typically issued by relatively large companies, they are much 
less frequently traded than equities and government bonds, and part of these trades occur in more 
opaque over-the-counter markets rather than in open exchanges.
22 
Except in the case of mortgage bonds, the different columns show that the prevalence of 
herding increases as the number of PFAs trading an asset increases from column (1) to (3). When 
focusing on column (3), on those assets traded by more than half  of the active PFAs, we find 
significant evidence of herding for all asset classes.  The economic magnitude of the herding 
statistic is close to the evidence reported for mutual funds in developed countries in the literature, 
but still significantly higher in some asset classes when considering instruments traded by most 
PFAs (column (3)). As an example, herding in corporate bonds is 14 percent when considering 
assets traded by more than  three PFAs, up from ten percent when considering assets traded by 
                                                 
22 Some existing papers propose that financial institutions bonds are more opaque than standard corporate bonds 
(Morgan, 2002). However, more recent papers have shown that large banks are not more opaque than comparable 
corporations (Flannery et al., 2004). In Chile, only large banks issue corporate bonds, so one should not expect a 
large difference in opacity between these two asset classes. 21 
 
more than two PFAs, and up from three percent when considering assets traded by more than one 
PFA. In the case of mortgage bonds, we find less herding for the measures that consider bonds 
traded by more PFAs. This result is expected since the number of specific mortgage bonds in the 
markets is very large, with each bond being small. Therefore, the probability of a mortgage bond 
being traded by more than two PFAs is small.  
Overall, the results indicate that the presence of herding among Chilean PFAs in many 
asset classes increases as an asset is being traded by more PFAs. In other words, although PFAs 
trade in few assets, when various PFAs are active they tend to be on the same side of the trade.  
Table  5  reports  similar  herding  estimates  than  Table  4  (i.e.,  at  the  PFA  level)  but 
constraining  the  sample  to  the  multi-fund  period,  2002-2005,  when  more  funds  become 
available. The results show that herding is still prevalent among corporate bonds and financial 
institutions bonds but significantly less so in other asset classes, except for a couple of instances 
for  mortgage  bonds  and  government  bonds.  Again,  as  assets  are  traded  by  more  PFAs  the 
herding statistics increase. The differences in results between Table 4 and Table 5 suggest that 
part of the herding might be driven by competition between pension funds, not PFAs, since 
herding  is  stronger  when  including  the  period  for  which  only  one/two  funds  per  PFA  are 
available (Table 4).
23 As the number of funds within PFAs increase s, the degree of herding 
across asset classes diminishes.  
Given that part of the herding seems to be explained by trading at the fund level, Table 6 
shows herding statistics using all funds across PFAs, without distinguishing the PFA or type to 
which each fund belongs. That is, this herding measur e is computed at the most disaggregate 
level, taking into account the within PFA and across PFA variation, across any type of fund. The 
                                                 
23 During 1996-1999, pension funds administrators offered a single fund (corresponding to Fund C in the current 
classification),  and  during  2000-2002  they  offered  two  funds  (corresponding  to  Funds  C  and  D  in  the  current 
classification). 22 
 
results in Table 6 show again that herding is more prevalent in corporate bonds and financial 
institutions bonds. However, the point estimates are noticeably smaller  than in Table 5. For 
example, in the case of corporate bonds traded by more than three PFAs, the herding statistic in 
Table 6 is 4.58 while that in Table 5 is 20.55. The only result that does not follow this pattern is 
the degree of herding in equities, for which coefficients become statistically significant in Table 
6. In other words, part of the herding in equities is explained by the fund-level behavior. Since 
different  fund  types  face  different  regulatory  limits  on  their  portfolio  allocations,  it  is  not 
surprising that the herding statistic is lower when considering the trades conducted by different 
fund types (since they would be investing in different asset classes). However, these differences 
in regulatory constraints cannot fully account for the observed decline in herding because they 
only restrict the composition of a fund’s portfolio across asset classes. Whereas these constraints 
could reduce the degree of overall herding computed by pooling all asset classes, as Table 6 
shows, the decline in herding occurs within each asset class. Overall, while the results in Table 6 
suggest that fund-level herding is important, they leave unanswered the question of how funds 
specifically interact with each other in their trading and herding activity. We explore this issue in 
the next set of tables.  
Table 7 reports results of herding among funds within PFAs. As above, the comparison 
within asset classes eases concerns about the different compositions of the portfolios of different 
types  of funds.  While one still observes  significantly more herding for corporate bonds  and 
financial institutions bonds, the herding statistics are also significant for government bonds and, 
in one instance, for mortgage bonds. These results hold when assets are traded by more than two 
and more than three funds. The results suggest then that part of the herding in government bonds 
is driven by PFAs purchasing those securities for several of their funds. In fact, PFAs participate 23 
 
actively in government bond auctions, demanding a significant proportion of the securities that 
come to markets (Opazo et al., 2009). 
Table 8 shows results by comparing funds within fund types across PFAs. Interestingly, 
the herding statistics increase noticeably across the board in this case, both in terms of the point 
estimates and the statistical significance of the coefficients. For example, relative to the estimates 
at the PFA level, the average herding across asset classes in Table 8 is 5.80 for assets traded by 
more than two funds, vis-à-vis 4.02 in Table 5, and 5.22 for assets traded by more than one fund, 
vis-à-vis 2.00 in Table 5. The asset classes that experience more herding are corporate bonds and 
financial institutions bonds. The ones that experience less herding are government bonds and 
mortgage bonds. Equity is in the middle. What is also clear from this table is that the herding in 
equity  is  driven  almost  exclusively  by  herding  within  fund  types  across  PFAs.  Table  9 
decomposes herding by type of fund and shows that the within fund type herding is not due to 
herding in only one fund type. Instead, herding within fund types across PFAs occurs across all 
types of funds.  
As mentioned in Section 3, pension funds tend to purchase fixed income securities at 
issuance and hold them until maturity. The herding statistics reported above do not include the 
dates when instruments are removed from the markets. So they are not affected by the maturing 
fixed income instruments. However, they do include initial purchases at issuance. While this 
does not pose a bias to the estimates, it raises the question of whether herding is driven mainly 
by  these  initial  acquisitions.  To  answer  this  question,  we  re-compute  the  herding  statistics 
excluding purchases at issuance for fixed income assets. We do so for the estimates at the PFA 
level and within fund types across PFAs, reported in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. Relative to 
Table 4, the estimates in Table 10 show that herding is prevalent even after the purchases at 24 
 
issuance, when securities are bought in secondary markets.
24 However, as expected, the herding 
estimates for fixed income securities are lower when initial acquisitions are removed from the 
sample. Relative to the previous tables, the ranking of herding across asset  classes holds. The 
comparison between Tables 8 and 11 yield similar conclusions.  
To further understand where the trading behavior is coming from, we decompose herding 
into herding in buying and herding in selling following Grinblatt et al. (1995). Again, we do so 
for estimates at the levels of the PFAs and within funds across PFAs, reported in Tables 12 and 
13, respectively. In general, the results suggest that herding occurs at both sides of the 
transactions. That is, pension funds herd both when they pur chase securities and when they sell 
them in secondary markets. The only exception is the case of mortgage bonds that show herding 
only on the buy side. This might be due to pre-payment and restructuring of those bonds, which 
might lead pension funds to remove them from their portfolios at different points in time. 
 
5. What Other Factors Might Be Related to Herding? 
In  this  section,  we  explore  what  other  factors  might  be  associated  with  the  herding 
behavior documented above. In particular, we explore first whether pension funds herd only 
when they contemporaneously trade securities. Then we discuss whether herding is explained by 
momentum trading, regulation, or the availability of assets.  
Aside from the herding studied above, which refers to contemporaneous herding, there 
can also be dynamic herding, which is related to whether funds follow the herd with a lag. 
Therefore, assets that are more heavily traded in a given period are also more likely to be traded 
                                                 
24 These results may slightly overestimate the role of purchases at issuance. The reason is that we do not have the 
issuance date for the fixed income assets, so we assume that it corresponds to the date when the assets first appear in 
our  dataset.  This  is  a  good  approximation  because  PFAs  tend  to  quickly  absorb  fixed  income  assets  in  their 
portfolio. According to market participants, PFAs actively demand assets during the underwriting process. However, 
it is possible than in a few cases we may exclude the first purchase of an asset in secondary markets.  25 
 
in subsequent moments. This dimension of herding  is studied by Sias (2004), who tests the 
hypothesis that assets that are traded in a given period are more likely to be traded in subsequent 
moments  or  that  the  intensity  of  trading  is  serially  correlated.  We  do  so  by  estimating  the 
parameters    in the following equation for each month  : 
                      ,  (4) 
where        
                   
       
,        is the fraction of PFAs buying asset   at time   among those 
active (                 in the previous notation), and             and         are the average and 
standard deviation of        among all assets  , respectively. The parameter    corresponds, 
therefore, to the serial correlation of the standardized fractions of PFAs that are buying an asset, 
which is permitted to vary with time.
25  
Table 14 reports the results on dynamic herding. Each entry in the table reports the 
average    across months for various asset classes, its standard error, and the fraction of periods 
in  which  the  coefficient  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  a  ten-percent  level.  When 
considering all the active assets across classes  (first row in column 1), we find evidence of 
significant negative serial correlation in trades. Assets that are more intensively bought in a 
given month are significantly less likely to be bought during the next month. Moreover, this 
significant negative coefficient is obtained in all one-month regressions. The rest of the results 
                                                 
25 The reason Sias (2004) standardizes the statistics is that it conducts inference on    based on the time-variation of 
the parameters only (à la Fama-MacBeth, 1973) and the standardization of the variables controls for changes in their 
mean and variance over time. Sias’ approach is simple and intuitive but cannot be directly applied to the Chilean 
data because Chilean PFAs trade infrequently and a large fraction of the assets that are active in a month are not 
traded in the following one. This means that the sample over which the regressions in equation (2) can be estimated 
(i.e. the sample of assets traded in two consecutive periods) is different from the sample of traded assets in each 
period. Moreover, the mean and variance of the standardized statistics are different from zero and one, respectively, 
in the regression sample. Since the regression sample changes over time, the correct standardization in our case is 
time varying. We achieve this time-varying standardization by simply estimating the regressions of the raw fractions 
(      ) including a constant (to remove the mean of the dependent and independent variable) and then correcting 
the  estimated  coefficients,  multiplying  them  by  the  ratio  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  dependent  to  the 
independent variable in each regression sample. 26 
 
reported in column (1) indicate that the negative serial correlation is present in almost all asset 
classes, with domestic equities being the only asset class in which there is significant evidence of 
positive dynamic herding. One possible explanation for this finding is that pension funds cannot 
quickly adjust their positions in domestic equity markets. 
As  mentioned  in  the  Introduction,  aside  from  herding,  there  can  also  be  momentum 
trading. In fact, in Raddatz and Schmukler (2008), we show evidence of momentum. A fund is 
typically called a momentum trader if, on average, it sells assets with low past performance, and 
purchases securities with high past returns. On the other hand, a fund that sells past winners and 
buys past losers is called a contrarian trader, and a fund that follows none of these strategies is a 
no-momentum trader. 
The previous results on herding might be explained by momentum trading. If funds chase 
returns, they would tend to buy assets when their returns are positive and look like they are 
following each other, when instead they are following returns. However, the results from Table 
15, which regresses herding on lagged returns, suggest that momentum trading does not explain 
herding.  In particular, the herding statistics  are unrelated to  the  lagged returns of the assets 
included in each class. In unreported results, the same conclusions are reached if one analyzes 
dynamic herding instead. This suggests that herding behavior does not seem to be driven by 
managers’ common preferences over asset characteristics, such as stocks with high past returns. 
Regulation might also play a role in the findings on herding. Chilean PFAs are subject to 
a minimum return requirement relative to the average return that may induce fund managers to 
mechanically herd around the average portfolio to avoid penalties. The time variation of the 
herding measures can be used to determine the impact of changes in regulation. In October 1999, 
the average real rate of return to calculate the minimum return changed from 12 months to 36 27 
 
months. This greater flexibility was expected to reduce the degree of herding, because the reform 
has given managers more time to converge to the average return. Nevertheless, the data show no 
evidence of a decline in herding around the date of the reform. Table 16 compares the herding 
statistics computed in a window of 18 months before and after October 1999 for each asset class. 
For most asset classes, instead of a decline, we observe an increase in the herding statistic after 
the reform. Only among mortgage bonds, there is evidence of a small decline in herding. Thus, 
these findings do not support the claim that herding was mainly due to the tightness of the 
regulatory band. Note, however, that this is very indirect test of herding and that other factors 
might have influenced the degree of herding at that time. Furthermore, it is possible that the band 
affected  the  degree  of  herding  initially  and  that  once  pension  funds  engage  in  this  type  of 
behavior, to be close to their peers, it might be difficult to deviate.  
In  addition,  we  analyze  the  possibility  that  herding  behavior  may  be  driven  by  the 
regulatory minimum return band by comparing the degree of herding observed across funds that 
face different regulatory bands according to their risk profiles. Although the band is typically 
larger for riskier funds, groups of funds with different risk profiles (i.e., funds investing different 
shares of their portfolios in riskier assets) face the same regulatory band. For instance, funds C, 
D, and E face a band of two percentage points around the average return despite their different 
risk profiles; for funds A and B the band is of four percentage points. Intuitively, a given size of 
regulatory band should be more binding for riskier funds because of their higher absolute return 
volatility. Thus, we would expect to observe more herding in fund C than in D and E, and in A 
relative  to  B.
26  The results shown in Table 9 above tend to support t his prediction. When 
                                                 
26 The idea is simply that funds investing in riskier assets will have a higher degree of idiosyncratic volatility if they 
do not follow the herd, making them more likely to hit the regulatory band. On the other hand, if they always follow 
the crowd, all risk in their portfolios would be aggregate risk. So, even if their absolute returns are volatile, their 
relative returns would not.  28 
 
considering herding over all asset classes the table shows that herding in Fund A is larger than 
that in Fund B. Moreover, herding in Fund C is higher than that in Fund D, which in turn is 
higher than that in Fund E. Note that the pattern in Table 9 cannot simply result from a relation 
between the riskiness of assets and herding. If that were the case, there should be a decreasing 
degree of herding as the riskiness of the portfolio declines from fund type A to fund type E. 
Instead, the decreasing relation occurs only across funds that face similar regulatory bands. This 
suggests that regulations that lead funds to follow industry benchmarks, such as a minimum 
return band, might impact the way that funds behave and induce herding. In sum, the evidence 
provides only mixed support to the idea that aspects of the regulation may contribute to herding 
among pension funds. 
Finally, the herding results are also not driven by the lack of available instruments. This 
conclusion can be reached by comparing the number of instruments approved by the Risk-Rating 
Commission (Comisión Clasificadora de Riesgo, CCR) in various asset classes for the period 
2002-2005 and the fraction of approved instruments in which PFAs invest. On average, PFAs 
invest only in a subset of the available assets, 47 percent for the case of corporate bonds. This 
suggests that herding is not driven by the fact that all PFAs purchase the same assets when they 
become available because they have already exhausted the supply of investable assets. On the 
contrary, they select the same assets at the same time from a wide range of alternatives. Similar 
conclusions can be reached if one looks at the auctions of government paper and the biddings by 




Using unique pension fund data from Chile, this paper advances our understanding of 
herding  behavior  and,  more  generally,  the  investment  practices  of  institutional  investors.  In 
particular, the paper exploits the richness of the data to test for and characterize herding behavior 
among pension funds across different asset classes and levels of the industry. In doing so, it 
sheds  important  light  on  the  underpinnings  of  herding,  and  on  the  consequences  that  the 
emergence of institutional investors might have for capital market development. 
The paper shows that pension funds herd significantly in their investment decisions. In 
particular, herding is more pronounced on instruments that are more opaque, suggesting that 
pension funds copy each other in their investment decision as a way to overcome informational 
problems. Thus, herding is more prevalent in corporate and financial institutions bonds, followed 
by equity and government bonds. This ranking of herding across asset classes is robust across the 
different levels of disaggregation we analyze (PFA level, PFA-fund level, and so forth). These 
findings are consistent with the view that asset characteristics matter for herding, and highlight 
an important shortcoming of the existing literature on herding in that it typically focuses on a 
particular  asset  class.  The  large  prevalence  of  bonds  in  the  portfolios  of  many  institutional 
investors and the differences we document on the presence of herding in corporate bonds relative 
to equity suggest that existing evidence solely based on equity may lead to incorrect conclusions 
about  the  magnitude  and  potential  consequences  of  herding.  For  example,  the  recent  US 
experience  with  correlated  exposure  of  institutional  investors  on  mortgage-backed  securities 
indicates that the potential destabilizing consequences of herding may be large.  
Our results also shed some light on the relation between competition and herding. We 
find that herding is more intense when comparing similar types of funds across PFAs than when 30 
 
comparing aggregate PFA portfolios. Narrowly defined fund types are easily compared by the 
public, the regulator, the overall managers of PFA, and peers, and thus compete directly with 
each other across PFAs (each PFA can only have one fund of each type). PFAs also compete 
among them, but since the relative size of each fund type may vary across funds it is more 
difficult to compare them. Furthermore, we also find less evidence of herding when considering 
all PFA-funds together and when comparing various fund types within the same PFA. These 
results are consistent with herding being driven by incentives faced by managers to be with the 
pack  of  their  direct  competitors  and  not  deviate  from  industry  standards.  Thus,  contrary  to 
expectations, under certain conditions (such as the existence of relative industry-benchmarks), 
competition, understood as having a clear set of peers fighting for a certain market, may increase 
the incentives to herd rather than yield more healthy, dispersed behavior. 
Overall, the data indicate that the incentives of institutional investors to herd and not 
deviate from the pack seem to come from the complex interaction between the opaqueness and 
risk of the assets in which they invest, the endogenous and regulatory driven use of industry 
benchmarks (not exclusive to the Chilean case), and the existence of a clearly defined group of 
competitors. Pension funds are usually regulated and monitored to protect pensioners’ assets. To 
avoid misbehavior, managers are continually evaluated by investors, regulators, and their own 
managers against deviations from a benchmark, which might induce them to herd and stay close 
to  their  peers  regardless  of  absolute  returns.  Furthermore,  while  regulations  might  promote 
herding  by  establishing  bands  within  which  returns  across  funds  have  to  lie,  the  evidence 
presented  here  shows  that  herding  does  not  decrease  when  regulations  are  loosened.  More 
generally,  investors  and  regulators  face  a  trade-off  between  the  need  for  monitoring  asset 
managers  on  a  regular  basis  and  giving  them  incentives  and  space  to  engage  in  long-term 31 
 
arbitrage and asset discovery. These incentives on asset allocation by pension funds and other 
institutional investors might be important and have been typically overlooked by the literature. 
In  addition  to  the  lessons  offered  by  our  results  on  the  determinants  of  herding,  the 
patterns  described  in  the  paper  seem  to  run  contrary  to  the  initial  expectations  in  emerging 
markets about the role of pension funds as drivers of secondary capital market development. On 
the bright side, pension funds seem to absorb a large amount of bonds in primary markets, likely 
allowing the corporate sector to issue bonds and effectively contributing to the development of 
that market. However, the characterization is difficult to align with the initial ideas about pension 
funds as agents that contribute in many different ways to the development of domestic capital 
markets. Consider that these are likely to be the most sophisticated  investors in the market, 
especially in developing countries, with plenty of resources to gather private information and 
manage the portfolios professionally. Instead, the high degree of herding behavior is consistent 
with funds following each other in their investment strategies. Moreover, herding behavior does 
not seem to be explained by the lack of investable instruments because pension funds invest only 
in a fraction of the existing and pre-approved assets. In addition, pension funds tend to display 
relatively little turnover, which does not seem to square well with the idea that they contribute to 
the liquidity of secondary markets. Overall, the evidence suggests that at least the initial ideas 
that motivated the introduction of pension funds as dynamic agents of secondary capital market 
development would need to be revisited. 32 
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Pension System Holdings
This figure shows the size of total assets of pension funds across all PFAs relative to Chile's GDP by fund type for
the entire sample period (July 1996 to December 2005). The fund types reflect different risk profiles, from the
riskiest fund (Fund A) to the most conservative fund (Fund E). The nominal values are computed for December of


























































































Fund AFund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund E
Domestic Assets
Ct B d 46 % 95 % 91 % 13 2% 12 3%
Average PFA Portfolio Share by Asset Class and Fund Type (1996 - 2005)
Fund Type
Table 1
PFA Holdings by Asset Class and Fund Type
This table presents the average share across PFAs and time of each asset class by fund type (July 1996 to December 2005 for
Fund C, May 2000 to December 2005 for Fund E, September 2002 to December 2005 for Funds A, B, and D). Shares are
calculated only considering asset classes shown in the table. Derivatives, investment and mutual funds quotas, former pension
system bonds, deposits, and foreign assets are excluded from the analysis. Portfolio weights of each asset class are calculated per
PFA and fund type, for each month, and averaged over time. For Fund E, no investments are allowed in equity.
Corporate Bonds 4.6% 9.5% 9.1% 13.2% 12.3%
Financial Institutions Bonds 1.3% 2.9% 3.4% 3.3% 3.4%
Government Bonds 14.1% 29.4% 43.3% 47.9% 61.6%
Mortgage Bonds 5.2% 13.6% 19.8% 19.0% 24.0%
Equity 74.8% 44.6% 24.3% 16.6% -2002 2003 2004 2005
Corporate Bonds
Total Amount Issued (Millions of Dollars) 6,064 7,693 11,206 11,560
N u m b e r  o f  C o m p a n i e s 3 64 05 45 3
Median Amount per Company (Millions of Dollars) 95.0 114.1 150.0 175.3
Government Bonds
Total Amount Issued (Millions of Dollars) 2,087 4,238 4,981 4,967
Number of Issuances 80 232 263 294
Median Amount per Issue (Millions of Dollars) 4.0 2.4 4.0 5.0
Equity
Total Amount Issued (Millions of Dollars) 318 44 654 1,126
Number of Companies 14 2 4 7
Table 2
Evolution of Chilean Equity and Fixed Income Markets
This table shows the evolution of the issuances and turnover of Chilean equity and fixed income markets from 2002 to 2005. Panel A presents
the total amount issued, the number of companies, and the median amount issued by company during each year for corporate bonds,
government bonds, and equity. Panel B presents the turnover ratio for each asset class as the annual value traded divided by end of the year
market value. The turnover ratio for government and corporate bonds is obtained from Eterovic et al. (2011). The turnover ratio for equity is
obtained from the World Development Indicators and it is adjusted by free float market capitalization using Dahlquist et al. (2003). The
corporate bonds category in Panels A and B includes both financial institutions bonds and corporate bonds. Panel C presents the trading
frequency for each asset class as the average percentage of trading days in which instruments are traded. Panel D presents the median amount
of assets for the main companies, considering the 40 listed companies that compose the main Chilean stock market index (IPSA) for equity,
and the biggest 40 companies that have outstanding corporate bonds. 
Panel A. Issuances
p
Median Amount per Company (Millions of Dollars) 2.6 22.0 165.1 155.0
2002 2003 2004 2005
Corporate Bonds 32% 34% 38% 40%
Government Bonds 420% 460% 290%
Equity 38% 52% 62% 76%
2002 2003 2004 2005
Corporate Bonds - - 46% -
Government Bonds - - 100% -
Equity 92% 90% 92% 95%
2002 2003 2004 2005
Corporate Bonds 1,008 1,118 1,110 1,696
Equity 979 998 1,367 1,888
Panel D. Size of Main Companies Issuing Equity and Corporate Bonds (Millions of Dollars)
Panel C. Trading Frequency (Percentage of Trading Days)
Panel B. Turnover RatioAll Asset Classes
Corporate Bonds
PFA Level PFA-Fund Level
Table 3
Pension Fund Trading Activity Measures
Panel A presents trading statistics using data from the multi-fund period (2002 to 2005). Column (1) presents the average percentage of assets traded by PFAs as a share of the total
number of assets held in their portfolios. Column (2) presents the average across PFAs of the difference in weights (contemporaneous weights minus lagged weights using lagged prices
for both) for the traded portfolio, calculated at the PFA level. Columns (3) presents the average percentage of assets traded by funds, as a share of the total number of assets held in their
portfolios. Column (4) reports the average across funds of the difference in weights for the traded portfolio, calculated at the PFA-fund level. Panel B presents the average proportion of
units of a given security that a PFA incorporates into its portfolio in its first purchase and the proportion of units of that security that a PFA liquidates at the security’s maturity date.
Both measures are relative to the maximum number of units of that security that the PFA holds in its portfolio at any time and are calculated at the PFA level and the PFA-fund level,
across all instruments for each asset class and averaged across PFAs or PFA-Funds. For both ratios, average and standard deviation are presented for each asset class. 
Panel A. Average Percentage of Assets Traded by PFAs
Trading Statistics
Percentage of Assets Traded 
Relative to Assets Held  Share of Traded Portfolio
Percentage of Assets Traded 
Relative to Assets Held  Share of Traded Portfolio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
15.6% 3.4% 17.4% 3.7%

















PFA level (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Corporate Bonds 0.91 0.13 0.91 0.09 0.87 0.14 0.87 0.17
Financial Institutions Bonds 0.90 0.10 0.94 0.04 0.87 0.13 0.90 0.10
Government Bonds 0.66 0.23 0.85 0.10 0.61 0.21 0.89 0.07
Mortgage Bonds 0.86 0.03 0.68 0.12 0.84 0.10 0.71 0.13
11.4% 0.1% 12.6% 0.1%
12.4% 1.7% 13.6% 1.7%
Panel B. Proportion of Fixed-Income Instruments Bought and Held Until Expiration
16.2% 0.3% 18.0% 0.4%
41.9% 1.1% 35.8% 1.3%
Ratio of Units at First Purchase     
to Maximum Units in Portfolio
Ratio of Units at Expiration        
to Maximum Units in Portfolio
PFA Level PFA-Fund Level
Ratio of Units at First Purchase     
to Maximum Units in Portfolio
Ratio of Units at Expiration        
to Maximum Units in Portfolio(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 4
Herding at the PFA Level 
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class at the PFA level considering each PFA as an individual entity.T h eh e r d i n g
statistic is calculated using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on
the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one, more than two,a n dm o r e
than three PFAs respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying
an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one PFA, by asset class. T-tests are one-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Herding Statistic
Average Probability of 
Buying an Asset 
Assets Traded by More 
than One PFA
Assets Traded by More 
than Two PFAs
Assets Traded by More 
than Three PFAs
() () (3) ()
All Asset Classes 0.90 *** 2.41 *** 3.84 ***
(0.29) (0.41) (0.47)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 3.10 *** 10.24 *** 13.78 ***
(0.64) (0.92) (0.06)
Financial Institutions Bonds 6.16 *** 10.31 *** 9.21 ***
(0.92) (1.38) (1.81)
Government Bonds -2.11 0.79 *** 3.82 ***
(0.16) (0.25) (0.46)
Mortgage Bonds 4.58 *** 2.21 *** 1.20 ***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)







53.44%(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 5
Herding at the PFA Level - Multi-Fund Period
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class at the PFA level, using data only from the multi-fund period (2002 to
2005). Each PFA is considered like an individual entity. The herding statistic is calculated using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in
time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results
considering assets traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three PFAs respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100).
Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one PFA, by asset class. T-tests are
one-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Herding Statistic
Average Probability of 
Buying an Asset 
Assets Traded by More 
than One PFA
Assets Traded by More 
than Two PFAs
Assets Traded by More 
than Three PFAs
() () (3) ()
All Asset Classes -1.01 2.00 *** 4.02 ***
(0.47) (0.71) (0.77)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 1.65 ** 12.52 *** 20.55 ***
(0.79) (1.33) (0.06)
Financial Institutions Bonds 7.49 *** 13.17 *** 11.46 ***
(1.18) (1.77) (2.48)
Government Bonds -5.06 -0.83 1.88 **
(0.29) (0.44) (0.86)
Mortgage Bonds 1.06 *** -0.63 -0.81
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05)







51.32%(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 6
Herding at the PFA-Fund Level
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class at the PFA-fund level, using data from the multi-fund period (2002 to
2005). Each fund in each PFA is considered like an individual entity. The herding statistic is calculated using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at
any point in time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present
the results considering assets traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three funds respectively. Numbers represent percentages (resultsa r e
multiplied by 100). Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one fund, by asset
class. T-tests are one-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in
parentheses.
Herding Statistic
Average Probability of 
Buying an Asset 
Assets Traded by More 
than One Fund
Assets Traded by More 
than Two Funds
Assets Traded by More 
than Three Funds
() () (3) ()
All Asset Classes -1.46 0.63 * 1.48 ***
(0.31) (0.37) (0.36)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds -0.96 2.46 *** 4.58 ***
(0.47) (0.58) (0.07)
Financial Institutions Bonds 1.42 ** 6.09 *** 8.37 ***
(0.76) (1.03) (1.23)
Government Bonds -4.56 -0.97 0.22
(0.19) (0.25) (0.32)
Mortgage Bonds 0.18 ** -0.17 -0.11
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)







54.95%(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 7
Herding within PFAs across Funds
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class, using data from the multi-fund period (2002 to 2005). The herding statistic
is calculated within PFAs and across funds and then averaged across PFAs, using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The herding
statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets
traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three funds respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (4)
presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one fund, by asset class. T-tests are one-tailed. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Herding Statistic 
Average Probability of 
Buying an Asset 
Assets Traded by More 
than One Fund
Assets Traded by More 
than Two Funds
Assets Traded by More 
than Three Funds
() () (3) ()
All Asset Classes -2.15 2.49 *** 5.36 ***
(0.47) (0.69) (0.84)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds -0.62 5.84 *** 11.85 ***
(0.71) (1.01) (0.24)
Financial Institutions Bonds 0.27 8.63 *** 12.38 ***
(0.97) (1.38) (1.85)
Government Bonds -3.26 4.87 *** 9.28 ***
(0.38) (0.68) (1.03)
Mortgage Bonds -2.93 -0.83 1.22 ***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.25)







58.15%(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 8
Herding within Fund Types across PFAs 
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class, using data from the multi-fund period (2002 to 2005). The herding statistic
is calculated within fund type and across PFAs and then averaged across funds, using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The
herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering
assets traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three funds respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (4)
presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one fund, by asset class. T-tests are one-tailed. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Herding Statistic
Average Probability of 
Buying an Asset 
Assets Traded by More 
than One Fund
Assets Traded by More 
than Two Funds
Assets Traded by More 
than Three Funds
() () (3) ()
All Asset Classes 3.71 *** 5.22 *** 5.80 ***
(0.39) (0.59) (0.94)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 12.33 *** 19.57 *** 24.03 ***
(0.68) (0.85) (0.10)
Financial Institutions Bonds 12.51 *** 15.49 *** 14.47 ***
(1.01) (1.51) (2.62)
Government Bonds 1.20 *** 3.43 *** 3.10 ***
(0.35) (0.67) (1.18)
Mortgage Bonds 1.93 *** 0.21 *** -0.10
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)







52.73%(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fund D Fund E Fund A Fund B Fund C
Table 9
Herding within Fund Types Across PFAs, by Fund Type
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class, using data from the multi-fund period (2002 to 2005). The herding
statistic is calculated within fundtypes and across funds (one per PFA), by fund type, considering assets traded by more than one fund for each fund type. The
herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied
by 100). For Fund E no investments are allowed in equity. T-tests are one-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Herding Statistic - Assets Traded by More than One Fund
() () (3) () (5)
All Asset Classes 5.87 *** 3.54 *** 7.99 *** 5.65 *** 4.67 ***
(0.92) (0.65) (0.49) (0.66) (0.84)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 13.61 *** 11.47 *** 20.80 *** 10.51 *** 13.02 ***
(1.93) (0.85) (0.08) (0.88) (1.06)
Financial Institutions Bonds 6.63 *** 10.78 *** 15.33 *** 9.49 *** 13.56 ***
(2.61) (1.29) (1.21) (1.25) (1.70)
Government Bonds 1.21 4.91 *** 2.96 *** 4.94 *** 2.08 ***
(1.72) (0.84) (0.44) (0.67) (0.80)
Mortgage Bonds 5.02 *** 2.89 *** 1.24 *** 2.52 *** 3.26 ***
(0.85) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14) (0.32)
Equity 6.32 *** 0.69 * 10.43 *** 6.68 *** -
(0.43) (0.45) (0.60) (0.64) -(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 10
Herding at PFA Level, Excluding Purchases at Issuance 
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class at the PFA level considering each PFA as an individual entity.F i r s t
purchases are excluded for fixed income categories in order to distinguish herding at the issuance date. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated
based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one, more than two,
and more than three PFAs respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability
of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one PFA, by asset class. T-tests are one-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
Herding Statistic 
Average Probability of 
Buying an Asset 
Assets Traded by More 
than One PFA
Assets Traded by More 
than Two PFAs
Assets Traded by More 
than Three PFAs
() () (3) ()
All Asset Classes -0.58 0.32 1.37 ***
(0.28) (0.41) (0.43)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 1.58 3.19 *** 6.97 ***
(0.61) (1.02) (0.05)
Financial Institutions Bonds 1.09 2.45 ** 2.32 *
(0.91) (1.06) (1.17)
Government Bonds -3.97 -1.57 0.20
(0.17) (0.27) (0.53)
Mortgage Bonds 2.66 *** 0.80 *** 0.28 ***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)







54.79%(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 11
Herding within Fund Types across PFAs, Excluding Purchases at Issuance 
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class, using data from the multi-fund period (2002 to 2005). First purchases are
excluded for fixed income categories in order to distinguish herding at the issuance date. The herding statistic is calculated within fund type and across PFAs and
then averaged across funds. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and
(3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three funds, respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results
are multiplied by 100). Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one fund, by
asset class. T-tests are one-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in
parentheses.  
Herding Statistic 
Average Probability of 
Buying an Asset 
Assets Traded by More 
than One Fund
Assets Traded by More 
than Two Funds
Assets Traded by More 
than Three Funds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Asset Classes 2.99 *** 4.16 *** 4.43 ***
(0.37) (0.59) (0.94)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 11.58 *** 17.32 *** 21.61 ***
(0.70) (0.92) (0.10)
Financial Institutions Bonds 7.79 *** 8.93 *** 6.27 **
(0.92) (1.42) (2.69)
Government Bonds 0.83 ** 2.88 *** 2.37 **
(0.36) (0.67) (1.19)
Mortgage Bonds 1.67 *** 0.37 *** 0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08)







36.04%(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Buys Sells Total Buys Sells Total Buys Sells
All A t Cl 09 0*** 88 5*** 12 7 24 1*** 78 4*** 25 6*** 38 4*** 85 8*** 30 2***
Table 12
Buy and Sell Herding at PFA Level 
This table presents the total average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic at the PFA level and the statistic for buys and sells subgroups following Grinblatt et al. (1995) methodology. Each PFA is
considered like an individual entity and the herding statistic is calculated using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is
calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one PFA, columns (4), (5), and (6) present the
results for asstes traded by more than two PFAs, and columns (7), (8), and (9) the results for more than three PFAs. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). T-tests are one-tailed.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Assets Traded by More than One PFA Assets Traded by More than Two PFAs Assets Traded by More than Three PFAs
Herding Statistic
All Asset Classes 0.90 *** 8.85 *** -1.27 2.41 *** 7.84 *** 2.56 *** 3.84 *** 8.58 *** 3.02 ***
(0.29) (0.50) (0.33) (0.41) (0.76) (0.50) (0.57) (1.15) (0.77)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 3.1 *** 1.9 ** 6.08 *** 10.24 *** 11.07 *** 12.34 *** 13.78 *** 13.73 *** 19.01 ***
(0.64) (0.92) (0.03) (0.92) (1.36) (0.02) (1.18) (1.73) (0.03)
Financial Institutions Bonds 6.16 *** 13.07 *** 5.38 *** 10.31 *** 20.04 *** 11.76 *** 9.21 *** 22.4 *** 9.69 ***
(0.92) (2.08) (1.32) (1.38) (3.27) (2.00) (1.81) (5.41) (2.25)
Government Bonds -2.05 0.93 *** -4.41 0.76 *** -0.15 2.06 *** 3.78 *** 4.8 *** 2.02 **
(0.16) (0.17) (0.24) (0.25) (0.29) (0.45) (0.46) (0.48) (0.94)
Mortgage Bonds 4.58 *** 34.41 *** -1.87 2.21 *** 27.89 *** -1.24 1.2 *** 19.16 *** -0.96
(0.07) (0.27) (0.01) (0.06) (0.40) (0.01) (0.06) (0.47) (0.02)
Equity 1.46 *** 1.62 *** 1.47 *** 1.94 *** 1.41 *** 2.58 *** 2.44 *** 2.52 *** 2.42 ***
(0.24) (0.33) (0.36) (0.27) (0.36) (0.41) (0.32) (0.42) (0.50)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Buys Sells Total Buys Sells Total Buys Sells
All A t Cl 37 1*** 58 8*** 20 1*** 52 2*** 88 5*** 56 0*** 58 0*** 99 7*** 47 4***
Table 13
Buy and Sell Herding within Fund Types across PFAs
This table presents the total average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic and the statistic for buys and sells subgroups following Grinblatt et al. (1995) methodology, using only data from the multi-
fund period (2002 to 2005). The herding statistic is calculated within fund type and across PFAs, and then averaged across funds, using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in
time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than
one PFA, columns (4), (5), and (6) present the results for asstes traded by more than two PFAs, and columns (7), (8), and (9) the results for more than three PFAs. Numbers represent percentages
(results are multiplied by 100). T-tests are one-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Herding Statistic
Assets Traded by More than One Fund Assets Traded by More than Two Funds Assets Traded by More than Three Funds
All Asset Classes 3.71 *** 5.88 *** 2.01 *** 5.22 *** 8.85 *** 5.60 *** 5.80 *** 9.97 *** 4.74 ***
(0.29) (0.50) (0.33) (0.41) (0.76) (0.50) (0.57) (1.15) (0.77)
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 12.33 *** 11.65 *** 15.01 *** 19.57 *** 16.14 *** 22.54 *** 24.03 *** 20.30 *** 26.80 ***
(0.68) (0.76) (0.04) (0.85) (1.36) (0.05) (1.02) (1.64) (0.08)
Financial Institutions Bonds 12.51 *** 14.34 *** 12.18 *** 15.49 *** 17.57 *** 18.63 *** 14.47 *** 19.81 *** 18.38 ***
(1.01) (1.29) (1.99) (1.51) (2.51) (2.15) (2.62) (5.28) (3.70)
Government Bonds 1.20 *** 1.19 *** 1.22 ** 3.43 *** 0.28 6.24 *** 3.10 *** 3.26 *** 2.96 *
(0.35) (0.41) (0.70) (0.67) (0.88) (0.98) (1.18) (1.36) (1.93)
Mortgage Bonds 1.93 *** 10.73 *** -0.81 0.21 *** 24.91 *** -0.94 -0.10 19.25 *** -1.07
(0.08) (0.31) (0.03) (0.07) (0.82) (0.04) (0.08) (0.83) (0.05)
Equity 5.20 *** 6.69 *** 0.47 5.88 *** 7.19 *** 2.42 *** 7.54 *** 8.92 *** 3.64 ***
(0.32) (0.33) (0.77) (0.35) (0.39) (0.75) (0.43) (0.47) (0.91)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Asset Classes Average Coefficient -15.49 *** -32.75 *** -28.12 *** -29.59 *** -41.08 ***
Standard Error (2.06) (2.82) (2.70) (2.69) (3.21)
% of Positive Coefficients 0.00 % 0.00 % 10.53 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
% of Negative Coefficients 59.46 % 91.89 % 86.84 % 91.89 % 92.11 %
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds Average Coefficient -15.33 -21.38 ** -20.90 *** -3.23 -10.82
Standard Error (10.7) (7.75) (3.93) (5.69) (6.65)
% f P iti C ffi i t 00 0% 00 0% 00 0% 00 0% 30 3%
Fund A
Dynamic Herding by Fund Type
Table 14
Herding Regressions. All Assets
Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund E
This table presents a measure of dynamic herding across time for all assets and by asset class, for each fund type. For each moment in time, we run an ordinary least squares regression of the
probability of buying an instrument at that moment on the lagged probability of buying an instrument. The average coefficient of this exercise is shown in the table. Numbers represent percentages
(results are multiplied by 100). T-tests are two-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The standard errors of the average coefficient are
presented in parentheses. In addition, this table presents the percentage of positive and negative coefficients that are statistically significant at a 10% level. The dashes in column (5) indicate that
equity is not traded by Fund E.
% of Positive Coefficients 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 3.03 %
% of Negative Coefficients 12.50 % 12.50 % 20.00 % 85.71 % 12.12 %
Financial Institutions Bonds Average Coefficient -29.47 -19.95 -9.58 -31.11 * -22.74
Standard Error (40.9) (25.9) (12.8) (16.1) (20.5)
% of Positive Coefficients 0.00 % 0.00 % 12.50 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
% of Negative Coefficients 0.00 % 0.00 % 12.50 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
Government Bonds Average Coefficient -33.95 *** -36.56 *** -28.33 *** -31.89 *** -38.50 ***
Standard Error (5.43) (3.30) (3.22) (2.97) (4.64)
% of Positive Coefficients 0.00 % 0.00 % 2.63 % 0.00 % 2.63 %
% of Negative Coefficients 34.29 % 70.27 % 73.68 % 72.97 % 73.68 %
Mortgage Bonds Average Coefficient -63.53 *** -55.57 *** -40.83 *** -45.14 *** -43.67 ***
Standard Error (6.45) (4.44) (3.74) (4.14) (4.04)
% of Positive Coefficients 0.00 % 0.00 % 7.89 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
% of Negative Coefficients 89.29 % 91.89 % 86.84 % 89.19 % 86.49 %
Equity Average Coefficient 17.79 *** 21.73 *** 22.42 *** 0.65 -
Standard Error (2.67) (4.00) (3.34) (4.79) -
% of Positive Coefficients 56.76 % 45.95 % 57.89 % 21.21 % -
% of Negative Coefficients 2.70 % 0.00 % 2.63 % 6.06 % -
This table presents a measure of dynamic herding across time for all assets and by asset class, for each fund type. For each moment in time, we run an ordinary least squares regression of the
probability of buying an instrument at that moment on the lagged probability of buying an instrument. The average coefficient of this exercise is shown in the table. Numbers represent percentages
(results are multiplied by 100). T-tests are two-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The standard errors of the average coefficient are
presented in parentheses. In addition, this table presents the percentage of positive and negative coefficients that are statistically significant at a 10% level. The dashes in column (5) indicate that
equity is not traded by Fund E.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Asset Classes 0.85 *** -5.79 * -0.69 0.94 -0.48 -0.98 1.04 *** 10.64
(0.02) (3.72) (0.02) (3.29) (0.02) (4.02) (0.06) (7.11)
Domestic Assets
Table 15
Does Momentum Explain Herding?
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regression of the herding statistic that uses the asset-specific probability of buying an asset, on a constant and the lagged rate of return. The regressions are computed
over all asset classes and for each asset class separately, considering assets traded by more than two PFAs or funds. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). T-tests are two-tailed. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Herding Statistic on Lagged Return
PFA Level PFA Level (Multi-Fund Period) PFA-Fund Level Within Fund Types across PFAs 
Constant Lagged Return Constant Lagged Return Constant Lagged Return Constant Lagged Return
Domestic Assets
Corporate Bonds 8.54 *** 47.53 8.69 *** 87.42 -0.11 -8.09 19.89 *** 15.54
(0.20) (88.22) (0.07) (97.59) (0.00) (13.95) (0.03) (21.45)
Financial Institutions Bonds 8.12 *** -82.76 ** 8.69 *** -84.08 ** 2.87 *** -35.90 12.49 *** -29.25 **
(0.15) (47.14) (0.05) (45.72) (0.08) (33.74) (0.05) (12.56)
Government Bonds -1.67 12.38 -2.26 8.66 -2.52 15.7 *** 5.38 *** 8.67
(0.08) (18.74) (0.02) (15.11) (0.02) (4.69) (0.00) (11.69)
Mortgage Bonds 1.21 *** -44.8 *** -0.64 * -17.33 * -0.53 -12.60 0.17 *** -9.02
(0.13) (16.18) (0.08) (11.58) (0.06) (12.34) (0.05) (7.55)
Equity 1.68 *** -3.45 0.06 6.61 0.87 *** 2.70 6.48 *** 0.58
(0.02) (4.03) (0.10) (5.26) (0.06) (2.71) (0.10) (4.88)Corporate Bonds 4.15 ** 7.07 *** 2.19 ** 8.85 *** 1.85 ** 8.29 ***
(1.81) (1.94) (0.98) (2.38) (0.90) (2.85)
Financial Institutions Bonds -0.57 7.01 ** -0.43 8.03 ** 7.61 6.47 **
(2.22) (3.13) (2.96) (4.16) (4.03) (2.32)
Gt B d 04 4 00 0 11 0 07 9** 34 0** 23 0***
Table 16
Evolution of Herding Statistic
Panel A. Herding Statistic
This table presents the average Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class considering 18 months before and after the regulatory reform in October 1999. Panel A shows the herding statistic for Fund C, using the asset-specific
probability of buying an asset at any point in time. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Panel B shows p-values for the one-sided t-test of equality of the herding statistic between the observations previous to the
regulatory reform (April 1998 to October 1999) and the observations after the reform (October 1999 to April 2001). T-tests are one-tailed. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses. 
Before Regulatory Reform After Regulatory Reform
Assets Traded by More than One PFA Assets Traded by More than Two PFAs Assets Traded by More than Three PFAs
Before Regulatory Reform After Regulatory Reform Before Regulatory Reform After Regulatory Reform
Government Bonds- 0.44 -0.00 1.10 0.79 ** 3.40 ** 2.30 ***
(0.44) (0.27) (0.87) (0.46) (1.44) (0.87)
Mortgage Bonds 6.56 *** 6.02 *** 3.46 *** 2.65 *** 1.70 *** 1.10 ***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)
Equity 0.81 * 2.64 *** 1.16 ** 3.15 *** 1.60 ** 4.14 ***









Panel B. P-Value for Hypothesis Testing: Herding Before the Reform > Herding After the Reform
Assets Traded by More than One PFA Assets Traded by More than Two PFAs Assets Traded by More than Three PFAs
0.98
0.00
0.40
0.95
1.00
0.98
0.01
0.79
0.98
0.93
0.99
0.00